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Resumen 
 
El trabajo discute los intentos más recientes de identificar los factores subyacentes al cre-
cimiento económico de largo plazo. El autor critica algunos de los argumentos y las prue-
bas históricas en que se basan las dos explicaciones que dominan la literatura reciente: el 
enfoque institucional y las que se centran en la importancia de los factores geográficos. 
Utilizando un enfoque deliberadamente ecléctico, el autor considera el papel de la geogra-
fía, el comercio internacional, el capital humano y la calidad institucional en la explicación 
del desarrollo. Se lleva a cabo una nueva estimación a través de mínimos cuadrados en dos 
etapas (TLSL), con variables instrumentales. Los resultados del modelo empírico confir-
man el papel central que las instituciones tienen en el crecimiento económico de largo 
plazo. Sin embargo, ciertas condiciones geográficas también parecen haber influido en las 
posibilidades de progreso de los países. El capital humano y la apertura comercial son me-
nos robustos en la explicación del crecimiento económico. 
 
Palabras clave: desarrollo, crecimiento a largo plazo, calidad institucional, factores geo-
gráficos, capital humano, apertura comercial. 
 
Abstract 
 
This article analyses current attempts to identify the factors underlying long-term eco-
nomic growth. The author criticises some the arguments and historical proofs in which are 
based the two main explanations which dominate recent literature: the institutional ap-
proach and those which focus on the importance of geographical factors. Using an ap-
proach which is deliberately eclectic, the author considers the role of geography, interna-
tional trade, human capital and institutional quality in explaining development. A new 
estimation is carried out through TLSL with instrumental variables. The results of the em-
pirical model confirm the central role of institutions in long-term economic growth. How-
ever, certain geographical conditions also seem to have influenced countries´ possibilities 
of progress. Human capital and trade openness are less robust in explaining economic 
growth. 
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Half a century after the conquest of Technotlican, the Spanish 
judge Alonso de Zorita asked an Indian leader why the Indians so 
often had bad manners and the Indian replied: “Because you 
don’t understand us and we don’t understand you and we don’t 
know what you want. You have robbed us of our order and sys-
tem of government, that’s why there’s so much confusion and 
disorder” (Taken from H. Kamen, 2003: 570) 
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1. Introduction 
Economic theory identifies the national en-
dowment of productive factors (as labour or 
physical and human capital) and the aggre-
gated level of efficiency with which those 
resources are employed as the causes of eco-
nomic progress: The modern theory of 
growth was based on this approach. Al-
though that analysis is highly persuasive, it is 
doubtful that it can explain the extraordinary 
levels of international inequality and the 
secular process of economic divergence to 
which Pritchett (1997) refers. Furthermore, 
the cause of the unequal dynamic of produc-
tive factor accumulation between countries 
still remains to be identified. Why is it, in 
short, that one country is capable of accumu-
lating physical and human capital at a faster 
rate than others? What is it that determines 
that one country makes better use than oth-
ers of the opportunities presented by techno-
logical progress? Answering these kinds of 
questions involves looking at other factors 
and wider frameworks. In order to do this it 
is necessary to identify the fundamental 
causes of the long-run growth: a task to 
which economists, politicians, naturalists and 
historians have recently contributed.  
 
The institutional framework has emerged 
from this approach as one of the potential 
explanatory factors of long-run development. 
Institutional structure defines the incentives 
and penalties which influence the behaviour 
of agents and shape collective action. In the 
uncertain world in which independent agents 
operate, with imperfect information, institu-
tions reduce uncertainty and transaction 
costs and facilitate social coordination. That 
is why institutional frameworks may explain 
long-term economic development trends. 
 
Trying to prove this hypothesis, however, is 
not a simple task, firstly because of the elu-
sive nature of the concept of institutions, 
which is the object of varying, and sometimes 
ambiguous, interpretations in economic lit-
erature. Frequently it is supposed that insti-
tutions are justified because they provide 
efficient responses to the transaction costs of 
the market. That comes from the assumption 
that economic agents have an  optimal con-
duct, as rational agents, that the progress of 
history finally weeds out inefficient institu-
tions and that those left increase overall lev-
els of wellbeing in society. As a consequence, 
there is no problem in defining “optimal in-
stitutions” – those which belong to “success-
ful” countries – and of seeking to generalise 
their validity beyond those countries’ borders 
where these institutions set up. A large part 
of “institution building” programmes of in-
ternational donors have been driven by these 
assumptions. 
 
Nevertheless, the failures of institutional 
“transplantation” reveal: i) that there is noth-
ing even close to a universally optimum insti-
tutional framework which can be applied 
independently of the social and economic 
conditions of the country in question; and ii) 
an institution properly does not exist if it is 
not capable of effectively shaping  the behav-
iour of the agents. That suggests that it is as 
important to analyse the rules imposed as to 
analyse the motivations of the individuals 
which follow them. That underlines the im-
portance of the social legitimacy (or credibil-
ity) of the institutional framework as a basic 
dimension of institutional quality; and rein-
forces the highly specific context of any insti-
tutional response which aims to be success-
ful. 
 
Additionally, the institutional framework has 
to be treated as a framework which is not 
only made up of formal institutions (based 
on explicit and universal rules), but also of 
informal institutions (those which are more 
opaque and less defined): a theme on which 
this article will insist. The relationship, 
which at times is conflictive, between both 
types of institutions may condition the capac-
ity for social articulation and the efficiency of 
the available institutional framework. That 
aspect is particularly relevant in the case of 
colonised countries which suffer the conse-
quences of an institutional framework being 
superimposed on the traditional one which 
existed. 
 
As well as the difficulties associated with the 
concept, institutional analysis also faces very 
diverse empirical problems. Those problems 
include: i) the existence of indicators of insti-
tutional quality which are still deficient; ii) 
the endogenous nature of the relationship 
between development and institutional qual-
ity; iii) the frequent correlation between the 
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variables which potentially explain economic 
development (which makes it difficult to 
consider them as independent factors); and 
iv) the possible existence of omitted variables 
which could condition the estimated rela-
tionships.  
 
In spite of these difficulties, in the last few 
years, a wide collection of empirical studies 
has tended to confirm the relationship which 
exists between institutions and developmen-
tal level; and, although in a less conclusive 
way, the link which exists between institu-
tional quality and the growth dynamic (Aron, 
2000). This is shown by  cross country analy-
ses (Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 
2002; Rodrik et al., 2002 or Easterly and 
Levine, 2003), those which use panel data 
(Henisz, 2000; Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001, 
or Varsakalis, 2006) or those based on case 
studies (Rodrik, 2003, for example). 
 
This article seeks to contribute additional 
elements to the analysis, working from a new 
assessment of long-term developmental fac-
tors. In order to do that, the work starts off 
with the debate which exists between the two 
main approaches which dominated recent 
literature: the institutional approach and 
those which focus more on the importance of 
geographical factors (epigraph 2). Although 
the greater explanatory role of institutions is 
assumed, the arguments of those who most 
notably represent this approach (Acemoglu et 
al., 2002, and Engerman y Sokoloff, 2002) 
are debated. In particular, the paper criticises 
to: i) the limited consistency of historical 
proof on which the institutional explanation 
is based (epigraph 3); and ii) the concept of 
institutions underlying their interpretation, 
emphasising the crucial role which informal 
institutions have in developing countries 
(epigraph 4). Using an approach which is 
deliberately eclectic, a new estimation is car-
ried out through TSLS with instrumental 
variables. The importance of geography, in-
ternational trade, human capital and institu-
tional quality – four factors which are most 
often presented - are tested for their role in 
explaining development (epigraph 5). 
 
The results of the empirical model confirm 
the central role which institutions have in 
explaining long-term economic progress. 
However, certain geographic conditions also 
seem to have influenced countries’ possibili-
ties of growth, either directly or through the 
other factors considered. Human capital and 
trade openness are less robust factors in ex-
plaining economic development. Although 
the influence of institutions is confirmed, 
they seem to be affected not so much by his-
torical factors (such as colonial or legal tradi-
tion), but more by variables which are sus-
ceptible to public action such as the degree of 
social cohesion or the way that the State is 
financed. 
 
2. The debate between insti-
tutional and geographical 
factors 
 
The analysis of the latest drivers of develop-
ment has been most recently conditioned by 
a debate between two main hypotheses. The 
first primes the importance of geographical 
factors, as location of the country, land con-
ditions, climate, the environment or geo-
graphical accessibility in determining the 
potential for economic progress. Although 
the relevance of these factors had already 
been highlighted by some of the pioneers in 
development studies (like Myrdal 1973), the 
most recent exploration of their significance 
has been carried out by Gallup, et al. (1999), 
McArthur and Sachs (2001), Sachs (2001) or 
Diamond (1997). Three strands can be found 
in this approach, which point to different, 
although not incompatible, consequences 
from geographical factors: i) the climate 
which conditions the likely result of devel-
opmental efforts and above all influences the 
productivity of the land and the people; ii) 
the geographical location, which determines 
the technological options, and the conditions 
of mobility and transport; iii) the persistence 
of certain diseases (disease burden), which 
appear to be influenced by the bio-physical 
conditions of the environment. 
 
In all these cases, it is factors beyond (or 
relatively beyond) human control which de-
termine the potential for development. The 
main arguments to support this hypothesis 
refer to the difficulties which countries have 
in implementing a successful development 
strategy if they are located between the trop-
ics or if they do not have direct access to the 
sea. They also refer to the costs which certain 
disease epidemics prevalent in environments 
which are also tropical have had on life and 
productive activity. Countries affected by 
these geographical conditions tend to present 
a much lower level of development, reaffirm-
 11
ing this hypothesis, even if the estimation is 
controlled by other factors such as colonial 
origins, dominant religions, ethno-linguistic 
fragmentation or the legal framework 
adopted. 
 
Nevertheless, the relative immutability of 
geographical conditions makes it unlikely 
that they are the source of the sudden 
changes which various countries have under-
gone on their road to growth (think, for ex-
ample, of China in the last two decades); it is 
also equally difficult to explain the divergent 
economic trends of countries which share 
similar geographical and environmental con-
ditions (Mexico and the United States and 
North Korea and South Korea, for instance). 
However, the most direct rebuttal to this 
approach comes from the way in which cer-
tain societies which previously stood out for 
their wealth have slipped backwards: this is 
the reversal of fortune to which Acemoglu et 
al. (2002) refers. The most striking cases to 
illustrate this phenomenon are the Inca, Az-
tec, Mongolian or Angkor’s Jimma, societies 
which stood out for their complexity and 
richness in the past and which today form 
part of the developing world. Given the rela-
tive immutability of geographical and envi-
ronmental conditions, these changes in the 
international development hierarchy, in the 
opinion of Acemoglu et al. (2002), call into 
question the geographical hypothesis.  
 
That said, however, the criticisms cited do 
not exclude the potential effect which the 
geographical environment may have on the 
processes of development. This is firstly be-
cause it is possible that geographical condi-
tions are not as immutable as Acemoglu et al. 
(2002) assume. Changes to climatic condi-
tions associated with serious drought or de-
grading pressure on a fragile ecological envi-
ronment, in combination with conflicts for 
the control of resources, seem to have been 
behind the collapse of societies which were 
relatively evolved such as the Huari, Tiahua-
naco, Calakmul, Mochica, Maya or Cahokia 
(Diamond, 2005; Fagan, 2008; o Mann, 
2006). Additionally, it is also possible that 
certain environmental characteristics prove 
of limited significance in a certain context 
but highly significant in another. For exam-
ple, it is possible that the inland location of 
some Latin American colonial capitals was of 
little significance at the time of their estab-
lishment when economic exchanges were 
limited and defensive reasoning was central, 
but those locations could become an obstacle 
for communication and transport once those 
Latin American economies were integrated in 
the international market. However, the fact 
that geographical factors matter does not 
necessarily mean that they are the most cen-
tral cause of economic backwardness. 
 
This assumption feeds the hypothesis of 
those who consider that institutions (and not 
geography) determine a country’s possibili-
ties of development. Institutions set the in-
centives and penalties which condition the 
behaviour of the agents and which help to 
shape expectations, reducing the degree of 
uncertainty and transaction costs which ac-
company social interaction. The overall 
growth potential of an economy is condi-
tioned by this means. 
 
The advocates of this approach suggest that 
in the case of developing countries, the de-
velopment of the institutional framework was 
centrally conditioned by the form which the 
colonisation process took. It is also possible 
to find two different interpretations within 
this approach. On the one hand there is 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2003), and Acemo-
glu Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002 y 
2006) (from now on referred to as AJR) who 
insist on the impact which the patterns of 
settlement of the colonisers had on the type 
of institutions which they created in the con-
quered territories – whether are market or 
extractive institutions. In places where the 
Europeans did not settle because of hostile 
environmental conditions and in those where 
there was an abundant population which 
could be directly exploited, forcibly con-
scripted or abusively dominated, the Europe-
ans did not worry about creating a system 
aimed at increasing overall well-being, tend-
ing to implant institutions which were gener-
ally extractive. By contrast, where colonisa-
tion was based in occupying virgin territories 
and in exploiting their resources, the colo-
nisers tried to generate institutions – partly 
transplanted from their countries of origins – 
which defended private property and the 
functioning of the market. 
 
This same hypothesis has served to explain 
the reversal of fortune. It is in the most popu-
lated and urbanised areas – in other words, 
the richest at the time of colonisation – 
where predominantly extractive institutions 
were established, which would be an obstacle 
to subsequent development; while, on the 
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other hand, in less populated areas – those 
which were poorer originally – the settlement 
culture which finished up prevailing was one 
which led to the creation of market institu-
tions, promoters of development. The rever-
sal of fortune is in reality the result of a re-
versal of institutions. 
 
The other variant of this institutional ap-
proach is the one which Sokoloff and Enger-
man (2000) and Engerman and Sokoloff 
(2002, 2005 and 2006) (from now on ES) 
suggest, that the  factor endowment condi-
tions not only the distribution of income but 
also the institutions in accordance with that 
pattern of distribution. Where there were 
conditions for the development of plantation 
with high economies of scale and the poten-
tial resource of slave labour, or where the 
ample availability of indigenous labour al-
lowed forceful methods of recruitment and 
exploitation, the patterns of distribution were 
highly unequal. In these environments insti-
tutions served only a limited elite and had a 
limited capacity to generate overall benefits 
for the society. By contrast, in places where 
there were hardly any indigenous population 
and where the conditions were more apt for 
family farming, more democratic institutions 
were developed which were capable of pro-
moting public goods, defending property 
rights and stimulating economic opportunity. 
 
Whether as a result of the settlement model 
or as a consequence of the pattern of factor 
endowment, in both cases the institutions 
created in the colonial period are those which 
determine the subsequent road to develop-
ment.  
 
3. The institutionalist  
approach and the history: 
some critical comments 
 
The institutionalist explanation has been well 
received in academic circles and in the 
sphere of international organisations. Echoes 
of this position can be found in the two stud-
ies which the World Bank devoted to the 
analysis of inequality and its relationship to 
development in Latin America: Inequality in 
Latin America: Breaking with History? and 
Poverty Reduction and Growth: Virtuous and 
Vicious Circles; and the same position under-
lying the study World Development Report 
2006, which was entitled Equity and Devel-
opment. 
There are several reasons why the institu-
tional hypothesis has been embraced: i) it 
connects with the fundamental principles of 
Anglo-saxon liberal philosophy – Locke, 
Smith or Stuart Mill – which underlie a large 
part of economic doctrine; ii) it insists on the 
role of liberal order and the defence of prop-
erty rights in the foundations of progress, 
positions that are well receive by interna-
tional donors; and iii) it plays down the un-
comfortable roles which both geographical as 
well as cultural determinism have. The insti-
tutional approach places the explanation for 
under-development in the social framework 
which shapes human conduct – institutions – 
aiming to make its explanation endogenous. 
 
However, beyond their persuasiveness, are 
the suggested hypotheses well founded on 
historical evidence? The method to test this 
used in both cases – AJR and ES – consists in 
using so-called natural experiments which 
come from the results of various colonisation 
experiences (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2006: 
38). Nevertheless, the data available is nei-
ther sufficient for the generalisation carried 
out nor does the information available sup-
port the hypothesis offered in all cases. It 
could be said that magna  interpretations 
(“meta-historical narratives” as Coatsworth, 
2007, called them) have been built up  from a 
very limited and not always consistent em-
pirical base. The consequences are an exces-
sive interpretive simplification, an exagger-
ated confidence in historical inertia and a 
fragile empirical foundation based on the 
assumptions used. 
 
To take the first of those problems, it is diffi-
cult for the disparate development paths of 
countries to be interpreted in terms of the 
limited binomial (extractive/exclusive institu-
tions versus market/inclusive institutions) 
classification which AJR and ES have pro-
posed. Latin America is a case in point1. Few 
colonial systems created an institutional 
framework which is as unified and homoge-
nous as the Spanish Empire (Elliott, 2006). 
How is it possible, therefore, for a common 
institutional framework to have resulted in 
such diverse results in terms of development? 
                                                 
1 The reference to Latin America seems particularly pertinent 
since it is one of the traditional cases of comparison used by 
the institutionalist approach (Engerman  and Sokoloff, 1997; 
Coatsworth, 1993; North et al., 2000;  or Acemoglu et al. 
2002, 2005). 
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As Coatsworth and Taylor (1998:26) reminds 
us, differences in productivity in the richest 
and poorest Latin American colonies were, in 
1800, “almost as great as for the entire 
world”. The differences manifested them-
selves even between countries where a rela-
tively similar model of colonial exploitation 
was applied. That is the case, for example, of 
Cuba and northeast Brazil, where the colonial 
model was based predominantly on planta-
tion and mass slave labour, but while one – 
Cuba – was one of the wealthiest societies at 
the start of the 19th century, the other – Brazil 
– was one of the most backward in the re-
gional hierarchy. In fact more detailed stud-
ies do not always seem to confirm the nega-
tive differential effect of large-scale slave ex-
ploitation in terms of economic growth2.  
 
The second criticism refers to the importance 
which the authors give to historical inertia 
(path dependence). It seems excessive to 
assume that the origin of today’s underdevel-
opment is the colonisation period in every 
case. In Latin America, that approach would 
imply the reason for today’s economic back-
wardness lies in facts that took place half a 
millennium earlier (a real “compression of 
history, as Austin, 2008, said). Has nothing 
significant happened since then? Historians 
do not seem to support that idea, rooting the 
origin of Latin America’s backwardness in 
much more recent times. For instance, 
Coatsworth (1998) cites it in the period of 
independence, underlining that Latin Amer-
ica was not underdeveloped in terms of any 
conventional measure (such as GDP per cap-
ita) until some time roughly between 1750 
and 1850. Harber (1997) and Bulmer-
Thomas (1994) locate the origin of the Latin 
American backwardness in the same period – 
the 19th century; and Prados de la Escosura 
(2005), who compares the region’s evolution 
not to the United States but to the rest of the 
OECD, puts that origin as late as the start of 
the 20th century. 
 
The third criticism relates to the doubtful 
empirical foundation of some of the assump-
tions made by AJR and ES. There are three 
discrepancies which are especially worth 
stressing (Alonso, 2007). Firstly, the impor-
                                                 
2 In fact, the studies containing the most macro-economic data 
do not seem to confirm the assumptions of ES. Here note the 
work of Nunn (2008: 165), who states: “I find that contrary to 
Engerman and Sokoloff´s hypothesis, there is no evidence that 
large-scale slavery is more detrimental for development than 
small-scale slavery”. 
tance which ES gives to the “encomienda”, 
an example of an extractive institution, seems 
to contradict the proven dying out of this 
kind of land ownership and social domina-
tion in the region from the 17th century on-
wards (Carmagnani, 2004); and nor can the 
“hacienda”, also considered a model of an 
extractive institution, be generalised as a 
dominating form of agricultural exploitation. 
Secondly, it does not seem as if Spanish colo-
nisation turned its back on regulation of 
ownership of land, mines and the means of 
production even for the indigenous popula-
tion (Dobado, 2007). That explains the 
emergence of a middle – and mixed – class as 
early as the 17th century, which in some cases 
became rather important in the region (Car-
magnani, 2004). 
 
However, of all the criticisms, perhaps the 
most significant is the one which refers to the 
level of inequality associated with extractive 
models of colonisation. The data suggests 
that the inequality in Spanish Latin America, 
although high, was not higher than other 
regions which underwent successful proc-
esses of industrialisation. For example, in a 
recent work, Milanovic et al. (2007) tried to 
reconstruct from various sources the levels of 
inequality of some pre-industrial societies, 
comparing them to those today. The Gini 
index which they estimate for “Nueva 
España” (the territories which are today Mex-
ico, a large part of Central America and the 
South of the United States) in 1790 was 
63.5%, revealing a significant inequality 
(equivalent to that which exists today in 
highly unequal countries such as Botswana, 
for example). However, the Gini index for 
the Netherlands, one of the pioneering coun-
tries of the industrial revolution was practi-
cally the same in that period (1732): 63%, 
and the corresponding index for England and 
Wales, the emerging power of the period, 
although somewhat less, was not that far in 
1801-3, at 51%. Why were market institu-
tions compatible with high levels of inequal-
ity in the Netherlands and England and in-
compatible in “Nueva España”? 
 
In the face of excessive generalisation, Latin 
America refuses to be homogenous. For ex-
ample, the same estimates which Milanovic 
et al. (2007) make for Brazil in 1872, a Gini 
index of 38.7%, shows a relatively moderate 
level of inequality, one which is equivalent to 
that in Portugal today. Given the high ine-
quality which characterises Brazil today, the 
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low Gini index which the country had in the 
19th century might seem surprising. Never-
theless, that result has been confirmed by a 
recent study which puts the country’s Gini 
index in 1872 somewhere between 38% and 
40% (Bertola et al., 2008). This result con-
tradicts ES’s assumption that an extractive 
colonisation (based on plantations and slave 
labour) is associated with institutions based 
on high levels of inequality; while it also 
forces us to consider why in this case limited 
inequality did not lead to market institutions 
and a more successful developmental process 
as the ES´s hypothesis suggests3. 
 
Moreover, the historical analysis show that 
high levels of inequality seem to be, more 
than a conditioner, a consequence of the 
international developmental and integration 
process of those countries. So, for instance, 
Williamson (1999), through an estimate of 
the wage-land rental, confirms that the 
sharper increase in inequality in a large part 
of the world periphery seems to have been 
produced in the decades running up to the 
First World War; Gelman (2007) suggests 
that the current level of inequality in Argen-
tina is a product of the last third of the 19th 
century; and Bertola (2005) confirms the 
same conclusion for Uruguay. The most 
complete estimate about this aspect, in rela-
tion to the whole of the Latin American 
Southern Cone, generalises the conclusion 
for the whole of the countries in that area 
(Bertola et al., 2009). Given those results, it 
is understandable that someone well studied 
in the history of the region, Coatsworth 
(2005: 139), concludes that: “the Engerman 
and Sokoloff’s thesis, while plausible, is al-
most certainly wrong”.  
 
4. Formal and informal insti-
tutions 
 
An additional problem to the approach of 
AJR and ES is the disputable concept of insti-
tutions which they adopt. Although they are 
not always explicit, it seems that beneath the 
approach of these authors lie the following 
assumptions: i) institutions refer to the for-
                                                 
3 Nor do the micro studies seem to confirm the relationship. A 
study of land distribution of the Colombian region of Cundi-
namarca led to a team which included Acemoglu to admit the 
existence of an inverse relationship to that imagined by ES: “.. 
somewhat surprising, we find a negative association between 
land inequality (land Gini) and political concentration” 
Acemoglu et al. (2008: 186). 
mal framework which defines a set of pa-
rameters within which the agents operate; ii) 
it is possible to set out a priori an optimal (or 
at least adequate) institutional framework 
which promotes development (these are the 
so-called “market institutions” in AJR’s ter-
minology); and iii) this framework is made 
up principally of institutions concerned with 
defending property rights and those which 
guarantee democratic forms of government 
(to these ES adds those referred to the supply 
of public goods, especially those related to 
human resource training). This concept 
comes up against two problems: the contin-
gent character of the institutional framework 
and the importance of informal institutions. 
 
The first of those problems refers to the 
doubtful assumption that it is possible to 
define an optimum institutional framework 
without reference to the social context of 
each country. The existence of multiple equi-
libria, the complementary nature of institu-
tions and the fact that a single institutions 
may carry out various functions makes it 
difficult to define a universally optimum re-
sponse to a given problem. Even when a con-
sensus may exist about a desirable policy, the 
range of institutional options to achieve that 
objective might be extensive. That underlines 
the importance of local conditions as basic 
determinants of the efficiency of an institu-
tional response (Islam and Montenegro, 
2002). In short, good institutions are, to a 
large extent, historically and socially contin-
gent. 
 
The uniqueness of institutional responses is 
what explains the efficiency of what are 
called transitional institutions (Quian, 2003): 
formulas designed to adapt the existing insti-
tutional framework in a specific situation to 
changes in the environment, which do not 
respond to canonical formulas of supposedly 
optimal institutions but which allow ineffi-
ciencies to be corrected through a dynamic 
and highly specific progress. Probably, from a 
formal point of view these responses could be 
considered inefficient, but in reality they are 
transitional means which are adapted to local 
conditions which generate processes of 
change which are consistent with develop-
ment objectives. For example, no one would 
suggest that China is an example of liberal 
society or a defender of property rights (the 
two elements of the institutional framework 
which AJR most values), but its GDP per 
capita has grown at an average rate of 7% for 
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more than two decades. What is happening? 
Is a successful economy trapped inside an 
inefficient institutional framework? What 
may be happening is that that country is gen-
erating highly specific institutional re-
sponses, supposedly inefficient if they are 
compared with the ideal model of a market 
economy, but highly dynamic in the specific 
context of the Chinese social reality. In that 
sense, these institutional responses are in 
keeping with the principle of adaptive effi-
ciency to which North (2005) alludes. 
 
The second problem refers to the limited 
consideration which AJR and ES make of the 
role which informal institutions play in the 
social make-up: in other words, those which 
are based not on laws or on explicit norms, 
but on beliefs, values, traditions and cultures. 
As Mokyr (2008: 75) points out, referring to 
the origin of capitalism: “customs, traditions, 
and conventions delineating acceptable be-
haviour were at least as important as a formal 
rule of law”4. Although both types of institu-
tions exist in every society, their natures are 
very different since while formal institutions 
are open to public scrutiny and provide a 
framework of recognisable incentives (and 
penalties) for the whole of society, informal 
institutions are harder to identify, partly be-
cause their rewards (and penalties) are less 
well articulated and partly because they may 
be highly specific and idiosyncratic responses 
to the conditions of a determined social 
group (more than for society as a whole). 
 
In a traditional economy (an underdeveloped 
country) informal institutions, based on cus-
toms and proximity, are highly efficient be-
cause they reduce transactional costs in a 
small market environment with limited pro-
ductive specialisation. As the market expands 
and advances in productive specialisation, 
production costs are reduced but at the ex-
pense of greater space for opportunistic be-
haviour as relationships become more distant 
and more numerous. As a result, transac-
tional costs rise, making it necessary to in-
creasingly turn to formal and multilateral 
rules which are impersonal in nature (Bard-
han, 2005). This process of change was stud-
ied by Greif et al. (1994) and Greif (2006) 
                                                 
4 Mokyr (2008: 66)  states: “I argue that the traditional empha-
sis on formal institutions has been overemphasized (..) The 
importance of institutions extended beyond politics and 
formal institutions. (…) Formal institutions such a state-
enforced patent rights have been overestimated at the expense 
of informal, private-order institutions”. 
who compared the responses of the Genovese 
and Maghribian people in long-distant trade 
in the 15th and 16th centuries. 
 
Through the process of change mentioned, 
there was more room for social dynamism, 
improving the “adaptive efficiency” of the 
institutional framework. In contrast, the ab-
normal perdurability of certain informal in-
stitutions could be seen as a potential obsta-
cle to social and economic change. By being 
less transparent and specific, informal insti-
tutions are more inert, less subject to social 
criticism and less likely to promote the social 
mobility which is the basis of any develop-
mental process. As North (2005: 157) states: 
“while the formal institutions may be altered 
by fiat, the informal institutions are not ame-
nable to deliberate short-run change and the 
enforcement characteristics are only very 
imperfectly subject to deliberate control”. 
 
The ingrained nature of informal institutions, 
with a high capacity for enforcement, can 
damage efficiency even when formal institu-
tions exist if the logic of the two kind of in-
stitutions is contradictory. It is therefore pos-
sible that in places where the aim has been to 
transplant a formal institutional structure 
and superimpose it on another, informal, 
framework which previously existed, and 
which has a different logic, the result has 
been inefficient because it has been incapable 
of shaping social behaviour. This observation 
explains the limited success which “institu-
tional transplantation” methods have had. 
They have aimed to replicate institutional 
responses in a developing country which are 
thought to be efficient in a developed coun-
try, but the responses sit poorly with the 
informal institutional framework which ex-
isted in the host country. Arnott and Stiglitz 
(1991) constructed a simple model which 
explains this process in the case of the insur-
ance model. Specifically, they argued that 
well-functioning informal insurance mecha-
nisms that provide protection against small 
shocks could undermine the diffusion of 
formal insurance by compromising the ability 
of formal insurers to impose deductibles on 
clients. This result could easily be generalised 
to other areas and markets (Stiglitz, 1999; 
and, more recently, Anderson and Francois, 
2008). 
 
Taking into consideration these elements 
could help shape an alternative interpretation 
to that offered by AJR and ES. One could 
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think that in places where “land colonisa-
tion” (the settlement of virgin territories) 
took place formal institutions (partly trans-
planted from Europe) should have domi-
nated, which better prepared them for mobil-
ity and social change in keeping with chang-
ing market incentives. On the other hand, in 
countries where “a colonisation of people” 
took place (including significant groups of 
indigenous peoples), formal institutions 
overlapped with previous informal institu-
tions (sometimes in conflict with one an-
other), increasing social fragmentation and 
making the mobility and social change, 
which the market domain demands, diffi-
cult5. Under this interpretation, the cause of 
economic backwardness might be not the 
colonial institutions themselves, but the in-
stitutional imbalance which the colonisation 
created, by overlapping new formal institu-
tions with a framework of existing informal 
institutions6. 
 
It is not easy to obtain information about the 
fabric of informal institutions; and less still 
when we are talking about past periods of 
history. Social fragmentation (whether ethnic 
or linguistic) may be, however, a good way of 
coming close to this phenomenon. The dura-
bility of these types of social fragmentation 
might be indicative of the larger presence of 
informal institutions. A negative relationship 
can be seen between the degree of ethnic and 
linguistic fragmentation (measured by 
Alesina et al., 2003) and the level of devel-
opment (measured in terms of GDP per cap-
ita, PPP, in 2006, by Maddison) (graphics 1 
and 2). Ethnic (and linguistic) fragmentation 
translates into societies which are more 
fragmented and unequal, observed through 
their positive relationship to the Gini index 
(graphic 3). And, finally, ethnic (and linguis-
tic) fragmentation also makes government 
                                                 
5 This vision offers an alternative interpretation to the non-
linear relationship between current degrees of inequality and 
the level of presence of (European) colonisers in the country 
in question, identified by Angeles (2007). His work suggests 
that where colonisation evolved a low presence of Europeans 
(the peasant colonies, like Subsaharan Africa) the level of 
inequality is not very high; it is still lower where the European 
presence was dominant (the new europes, like the United 
States, Canada or Australia); and, finally, inequality levels are 
at their higher in the case of colonies with an average presence 
of European colonies (the settler colonies, such as a large part 
of Latin America). It is in this type of colonies where the 
conflict between the institutional frameworks of the coloniser 
and the colonised must have been greatest and therefore 
where the costs of the process in terms of development may 
have been greatest.  
76 The response of the indigenous political leader refers to this 
in the quote at the start of this paper. 
 
difficult, judging by its negative relationship 
with the global governance index (graphic 4). 
 
Graphic 1: Ethnic fragmentation and 
development level 
 
 
 
Graphic 2: Linguistic fragmentation and 
development level 
 
 
 
 
Graphic 3: Ethnic fragmentation and 
inequality 
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Graphic 4: Ethnic fragmentation and  
Governance Index 
 
 
 
5. Empirical model 
 
The above points can be translated into an 
empirical model which enters into dialogue 
with the previous studies on this subject. In 
an eclectic approach, four basic factors could 
take into account to explain development. 
They are: i) Gallup et al. (1999) and Sachs 
(2001) insist on the importance of geo-
graphical factors (in particular on direct ac-
cess to the sea and the distance with respect 
to the tropics); ii) Acemoglu et al. (2002) and 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) underline the 
role which institutions have, conditioned by 
the model of colonisation which the country 
had; iii) to those two last factors, Rodrick et 
al. (2002) add the potentially positive effect 
of trade, measured through the degree of 
open trade7; and iv) lastly, Glaeser et al. 
(2004) argue that human capital is what 
conditions both the institutional capacity as 
well as the productive capacity of a society. 
To compare the importance of each one of 
these factors, the four are incorporated in an 
explanation of development (in a similar way 
as Rodrik et al. 2002). In other words: 
 
Yj = α1 + α2 Gj + α3 Ij + α4 Tj + α5 Ej + µ1
     (1) 
where Y is the GDP per capita (in PPP), G 
the geographical characteristics, I an index of 
institutional quality, T the degree of open 
trade, E the average educational level of the 
                                                 
7 Although it should be highlighted that in Rodrik et al. (2002)  
this last variable does not prove to be significant in the estima-
tion and even appears with a negative sign. 
people and j refers to the country in ques-
tion. The precise content of the variables is 
explained in the Annex II. 
 
The geographical characteristics are assumed 
to be acceptably exogenous and therefore do 
not cause problems in the estimation. How-
ever, the three last variables (institutional 
quality, commercial integration and educa-
tional level) may be endogenous: in other 
words, it is thought that they influence the 
level of development but development also 
affects the variables in question. Additionally, 
there may be relationships between the vari-
ables. The following, therefore, could be pro-
posed: 
 
Ij = β1 + β2 Yj + β3 Tj + β4 Gj + β5 Ej +β6 Xj + µ2 
           (2) 
Tj = π1 + π2 Yj+ π3 Ij + π4 Gj + π5 Ej + π6 Zj + µ3
           (3) 
Ej = γ1 + γ2 Yj + γ3 Tj + γ4 I j + γ5 Gj + γ6 Wj + µ4 
           (4) 
where X, Z and W are vectors of other ex-
ogenous variables to consider. 
 
Given the complexity in the supposed rela-
tionships, it might be worth exploring each 
one of the factors before proceeding to esti-
mate the equation (1), which comprises our 
final goal. To do this, in order to advance in 
the safest way possible, the aim will be to try 
to identify the factors behind each one of the 
variables proposed in (2), (3) and (4)8. In 
this way, more elements will be put forward 
in order to test the endogeneity of the vari-
ables which is supposed and to identify pos-
sible instruments which can be used. 
 
Additionally, in order to contend with the 
problem of the endogeneity it is necessary to 
turn to techniques such as Two Stages Least 
Squares (TSLS), with instrumental variables. 
As is known, a good instrument should sat-
isfy two demands: i) it should be correlated 
to the endogenous variables included in the 
regression; and ii) it should be orthogonal to 
the error process (Baum et al., 2003). The 
first of the conditions can be tested through 
the fit of the first stage regressions, consider-
ing the explanatory power of the excluded 
instruments in these regressions (through the 
                                                 
8 It is worth pointing out that the estimates in this first stage 
are not designed to create structural models of the selected 
variables, but rather to confirm the assumed endogeneity and 
to identify those variables which can be used as instrurments. 
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R2 or the F-test of the joint significance of the 
instruments in the first-stage regressions) 
(Bound et al., 1995). At the same time, the 
test of Anderson allows for the hypothesis 
that the instruments are the same at zero in 
the estimation in the first stage to be tested. 
However, for models with several endoge-
nous variables, these indicators may not be 
sufficiently informative. In these cases it may 
be useful to consider the statistic proposed by 
Shea (1997) as a partial R2 that takes the in-
tercorrelations among the instruments into 
account. A large value of the standard partial 
R2 and a small value of the Shea measure is a 
symptom of a model that is unidentified. In 
order to also check the existence of weak 
instruments the statistic proposed by Stock 
and Yogo (2004) can be used, for which 
critical values based on the F-statistic of 
Cragg-Donald are offered, considering up to 
three endogenous variables. These authors 
reveal that the problem of the existence of 
weak variables can be produced even when 
the tests of the first stage are significant. Fi-
nally, the second of the conditions high-
lighted – instrument’s independence from the 
unobservable error process - may be tested 
with the J statistic of Hansen (1982). A rejec-
tion of the null hypothesis implies that the 
instruments are not satisfying the required 
orthogonality conditions. In a similar way, 
the test of Sargan verifies the exogenous na-
ture of the instruments used. 
 
5.1.  PRIOR STEPS 
 
An overview of the geographical factors re-
veals (Table 1) that some geographical traits 
play a role in the process of development, in 
particular, variables like the distance from 
the tropics and the average degree of humid-
ity, which positively influence development, 
and the absence of direct access to the sea, 
which negatively influence it. However, the 
average degree of altitude of a country 
(which could come close to indicating the 
transportation difficulties in mountainous 
terrain) is not significant. These relationships 
are maintained even when diverse control 
variables are added which could be associ-
ated with institutional quality such as ethnic 
and linguistic fragmentation (in a negative 
sense) or a legal system based on common 
law (in a positive sense). That said, the ex-
planatory capacity of this combination of 
variables is limited (in the best cases they 
explain 53% of the variation of the variable). 
The second relevant factor in explaining de-
velopment is the capacity which an economy 
has, through open trade, to benefit from the 
dynamic stimuli of international markets. 
The openness of an economy here is proxy 
through the average weight of exports and 
imports as a proportion of GDP in the five-
year period 2000-04, expressed in loga-
rithms. 
 
The openness of trade may seem to be condi-
tioned by diverse factors: firstly, in a positive 
sense, by the degree of development of a 
country since it is plausible to suppose that, 
if everything else remained the same, the 
higher the level of development, the higher 
the international competitiveness; secondly, 
negatively, by the size of a country – meas-
ured by the logarithm of the population - , 
since this factor affects the measurement of 
the trade openness; thirdly, in a positive 
sense, by the historical potential of the mar-
kets in the region where the country is lo-
cated. In order to develop the analysis pro-
posed in the equation (3) it is worth finding 
out whether institutional quality or human 
capital influences also the level of openness 
of an economy. 
 
Out of all factors proposed, the “potential of 
the regional market” require an explanation. 
If country has been historically surrounded 
by prosperous an populated markets, it is 
likely that it will have a higher degree of 
trade openness. In order to identify this fac-
tor a new variable was created with data cor-
responding from 1890-1900, on the basis that 
this is the moment when the first wave of 
globalisation took place. First, an estimation 
of the “potential of the national market” of 
each country was made, considering the 
population of urban nuclei (with more than 
30,000 inhabitants) and the distance between 
the capital and each one of those, on the as-
sumption that a country’s business is concen-
trated in the cities. In other words, in the 
same way that with gravitation models the 
indicator of market potential is 
ij
ji
L
PP
Ln∑ , 
where P stands for population, i and j for 
urban nuclei with that minimum population 
threshold and L stands for the distance be-
tween both. In cases where no city had that 
size, the capital and the second largest city 
were considered. Therefore, the more urban-
ised a country was and the smaller the distan- 
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Table 1: Effect of geographical conditions on development 
Variables  Per capita 
Income 
(2006) 
(t-stat) 
Per capita 
Income (2006) 
(t-stat) 
Per capita 
Income (2006) 
(t-stat) 
Per capita 
Income 
(2006) 
(t-stat) 
Per capita 
Income 
(2006) 
(t-stat) 
Latitude  3.970 *** 
(11.202) 
3.354 *** 
(7.121) 
3.475 *** 
(8.739) 
3.493 *** 
(7.598) 
3.521 ***  
(9.085)  
Landlocked -0.723 *** 
(-4.527) 
-0.681 *** 
(-4.536) 
-0.590 *** 
(-3.894) 
-0.664 *** 
(-4.369) 
-0.531 *** 
(-3.535) 
Average alti-
tude 
-0.045 
(-1.140) 
-0.035 
(-0.908) 
0.058 
(-1.486) 
-0.031 
(-0.761) 
-0.060  
(-1.526) 
Average hu-
midity  
0.011 ** 
(2.581) 
0.011 ** 
(2.559) 
0.010 ** 
(2.419) 
0.013 *** 
(2.966) 
0.013 *** 
(2.918) 
Ethnic 
fragmentation 
 -0.876 ** 
(-2.360) 
 -0.915 ** 
(-2.470) 
 
Linguistic 
fragmentation 
  -0.257 *** 
(-3.428) 
 -0.312 *** 
(-4.079) 
Common Law    0.356 * 
(2.024) 
0.415 ** 
(2.432) 
R2  adjusted 0.467 0.490 0.512 0.499 0.532 
Number of 
countries 
154 151 148 149 147 
Method: OLS.  
Note: (***),(**) y (*): significant variable at  99, 95 and 90 percent, respectively.  
 
ce between the urban nuclei, the larger the 
effective size of the domestic market. The 
size of the regional market (which is the one 
which is incorporated into the estimate) 
comes from the weighted sum of the size of 
the potential of national markets of all those 
countries together whose capitals are located 
within a maximum radius of 3,000 kilome-
tres, which is what makes up a close interna-
tional market. The weighting factor was the 
average per capita income of each country in 
the reference year. 
 
The OLS estimation confirms the role which 
income, population size and the potential of 
the regional market play in the explanation 
of trade openness (column 1 of Table 2). 
However, the potential presence of a two-way 
relationship between openness and income 
level makes it necessary to use TSLS with 
instrumental variables. In column (2) GDP 
per capita in 1900 and those geographical 
variables which appear associated with in-
come level - latitude and the absence of di-
rect access to the sea - were used as income 
per capita instruments. Again, the estimation 
confirms the relationships assumed above 
and verifies the relevance of the selected in-
struments. In particular, the instruments pass 
the test of exogeneity and both the possible 
under-identification of the model as well as 
the test of the presence of weak instruments 
is rejected. 
 
It would be plausible to assume that trade 
openness may be conditioned by institutional 
quality or by the level of human capital (es-
timated through the indicator constructed by 
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Barro and Lee, 2000). Given the high co-
lineality between income per capita and insti-
tutional quality or human capital, the estima-
tion had to be independently carried out.9 In 
column (3) institutional quality is incorpo-
rated as an explanatory variable. Since in this 
case as well, it could be an endogenous rela-
tionship, the institutional quality is instru-
mented through ethnic fragmentation, lati-
tude and the origin of common law of the 
legal system. The estimation confirms the 
relationships although the explanatory capac-
ity of the model is significantly lower than 
the one which per capita income contributes. 
In column (4) human capital is considered as 
a explanatory variable In this case, although 
the variable has the correct sign, it barely 
reaches significance; and the variable be-
comes insignificant when it is combined with 
institutional quality or GDP per capita. 
 
The test carried out, although it does not 
offer a structural model to explain trade 
openness, is sufficient to confirm the as-
sumed endogeneity between income level 
and open trade; and to identify a series of 
variables which could function as adequate 
instruments in the estimate of equation (1).  
 
The third relevant factor to consider is the 
quality of the institutions. It is not easy, 
however, to empirically approach that vari-
able or to identify the factors which explain 
it. Firstly, there are many problems with the 
indicators available on institutional quality 
(Arndt and Oman, 2006 or Alonso and Gar-
cimartín, 2008). For the purposes of this 
empirical test the most complete and safest 
indicator will be used, the Governance Index 
elaborated by the World Bank: specifically, 
the value of the aggregate average of the six 
elements of this indicator. In order to com-
pensate for the limitations of this measure-
ment of institutional quality and to test the 
robustness of the results, the test will be re-
peated with alternative indicators of institu-
tional quality. 
 
The second problem posed refers to the diffi-
culty of identifying the factors which deter-
mine institutional quality. In this case, it will 
be assumed that institutional quality de-
pends, firstly, on the income level per capita 
                                                 
9 Additionally, the variables of institutional quality and educa-
tional level appear as significant (and with the sign changed) 
when incorporated along with income in the explanation of 
the degree of openness through TSLS. The results of these 
estimates can be requested from the author.   
of the country (in a positive sense): in the 
end, the higher the income level, the greater 
the demand of good institutions and also the 
greater the supply of the input required to 
generate it. Secondly, it depends (in a nega-
tive sense) on the levels of inequality of the 
society, which limit the extent to which 
agents are prepared to undertake cooperative 
action and which reinforce their tendency to 
turn to informal institutions, reducing the 
efficiency (and, at times, the credibility) of 
the formal institutional system (Alesina and 
Rodrik, 1993; Alesina and Perotti, 1996;  
Easterly,2001; or Eaterly et al. 2006)). Ine-
quality is estimated through the Gini Index. 
Thirdly, the quality of institutions may also 
depend on the nature of the relationship be-
tween citizens and the state. If there is a 
sound taxation system, there will be a more 
demanding relationship between citizens and 
State: the State claims taxes, which taxpayers 
pay, and in turn those who contribute fiscally 
demand accountability and efficient behav-
iour from the State (Moore, 1998). That is 
why in cases where the State is financed 
through alternative resources to taxes the 
quality of the institutions will be poorer, 
which could be the case when countries have 
a valuable and tradable commodity such as 
oil, as the literature on “resource curse” has 
demonstrated (Ross, 1999 or Dietsche, 
2007). This is borne out by analysis of the 
proportion of oil sales in a country’s exports. 
It would also be plausible to suppose that the 
level of openness of an economy (Rigobon 
and Rodrik, 2004; Wei, 2000; or Islam and 
Montenegro, 2002) and the level of human 
capital (Glaeser and Sacks, 2006 or Evans 
and Rauch, 2000) may play a role in the 
quality of the institutions, to the extent that 
both factors boost the efficiency of the state 
and the dynamic of the institutional frame-
work (as suggested by equation 2). 
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Table 2: Estimate of trade openness 
 Trade openness 
(t stat) 
 (1) 
Trade openness 
(z stat) 
(2) 
Trade openness 
(z stat) 
(3) 
Trade openness 
(z stat) 
(4) 
Per capita income 
(ly06) 
0.084 *** 
(2.825) 
0.074 ** 
(2.07) 
  
Governance Index  (ig)   0.126 ** 
(2.24) 
 
Years of training (lmae)    0.185 
(1.76) 
Population (lp) -0.185 *** 
(-9.476) 
-0.185 *** 
(-9.36) 
-0.147 *** 
(-7.03) 
-0.217 *** 
(-6.12) 
Regional marketl 
(1900) (lcry)  
0.091 *** 
(2.837) 
0.100 *** 
(3.26) 
  
 
Europe and Central 
Asia (eco) 
  0.309 *** 
(4.31) 
 
Eastern Asia (ao) 0.665 *** 
(4.534) 
0.623 *** 
(3.44) 
  
 
Latin America (al) -0.186 ** 
(-2.509) 
   
Adjusted R2  
Centrated R2 
Uncentrated R2 
0.462  
0.456 
0.993 
 
 0.339 
 0.998 
 
0.330 
0.985 
Underid. K-P test (p-
value) 
Weak id. K-P test (criti-
cal value) 
Overid. H-J test (p-
value) 
 χ2(3)= 28.543 (0.000) 
 
125.65 (10%=22.30) 
 
χ2(2)= 2.394 (0.302 
χ2(3)= 40.823 (0.000) 
 
82.17 (10%=22.30) 
 
χ2(2)= 3.70 (0.157) 
χ2(4)= 27.380 (0.000) 
 
41.37 (10%=24.50) 
 
χ2(3)= 4.042 (0.253) 
Test on Instruments 
used 
Overid Sargan test (p-
value) 
Underid Anderson test 
(p-value) 
Weak Inst. Cragg-
Donald (critical value) 
Shea partial R2 (partial 
R2) 
  
 
χ2(2)= 2.245  0.325) 
 
χ2(3)= 79.50 (0.000) 
 
57.504(10%=22.30) 
 
0.562 (0.562) 
 
 
χ2(2)= 3.522 ( 0.17) 
 
χ2(3)= 78.56 (0.000) 
 
52.06 (10%= 22.30) 
 
0.520 (0.520) 
 
 
χ2(3)= 2.91 (2.91) 
 
χ2(4)= 63.06 (0.000) 
 
60.90 (10%=24.58) 
 
0.759 (0.759) 
Nº of countries 152 141 157 92 
 
Column (1): Ordinary Least Square  
Column (2) Instrumented variable: ly06; Included instrument: lp, lcry, ao; excluded instrument: ly1900, nsea lat 
Column (3) Instrumented variable: ig; Included instrument: lp, eco; excluded instrument: lfetn, lat, legor_uk 
Column (4) Instrumented variable: lmae; Included instrument: lp; excluded instrument: lfetn, lat, legor_uk 
Note: (***),(**) y (*): significant variable at 99, 95 and 90 percent, respectively. 
 
Several of the explanatory variables men-
tioned may have an endogenous relationship 
with institutional quality, which means it is 
essential to use instrumental variables in the 
estimation. Before continuing with that task, 
it might be revealing to check that when per 
capita income is omitted and only exogenous 
variables are used, the estimate confirms 
some of the previously mentioned hypothe-
ses (table 3). In particular, institutional qual-
ity seems to be associated, negatively, with 
ethnic fragmentation (which is a proxy of  
the lacking of social cohesion) and with the 
proportion which oil represents in a coun-
try’s exports. Two geographical variables 
seem significant: the distance from the trop-
ics, positively, and the absence of direct ac-
cess to the sea, which has a negative impact. 
At the same time, the origin of the judicial 
framework based on common law has a posi-
tive influence (as La Porta et al. 1999 or 
Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002 suggest). The re-
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gions of Central and Eastern Europe and 
Southern Asia have a lower institutional 
quality than the variables incorporated into 
the explanation indicate. The relationships 
are confirmed when the variables of social 
fragmentation and the percentage of oil in 
exports are substituted with two more direct 
variables (although the two are less likely to 
be exogenous): the Gini index (column 2) 
and the weight of taxes as a proportion of 
GDP (column 3). 
The previous exercise is limited since vari-
ables such as per capita income, the degree of 
openness of the economy or the level of peo-
ple’s education have been set aside, which 
would suggest that they play a role on the 
quality of the institutions in a country. In 
order to incorporate these variables it is nec-
essary to define adequate instruments and to 
estimate relationships through TSLS. As we 
have seen, per capita income can be instru-
mented through the level of delayed devel-
opment corresponding to 1900, and through 
the geographical variables related to income 
level (latitude and absence of sea access); 
trade openness, through income level in 1900 
and the size of the country (estimated by the 
population’s logarithm) and the potential of 
the regional market; and the educational 
level, by the level of delayed income and eth-
nic fragmentation. 
 
It is also plausible to consider the Gini Index, 
which estimates the inequality present in a 
country, as endogenous. The variable resists 
a simple specification and proves highly sus-
ceptible to regional particularities. Neverthe-
less, the most general estimation suggests 
that its performance is in line with that 
which Kuznets set out: inequality grows in 
the initial phases of development and tends 
to correct itself once a certain level of per 
capita income has been exceeded. So, if the 
variable is considered as endogenous, it can 
be instrumented by per capita income of 
1900, that same variable in the square and a 
regional dummy with reference to Latin 
America which has a specific performance in 
this sphere. Alternatively, the variable was 
also considered as exogenous. 
 
Table 4 presents the results of this estima-
tion, confirming the relationships which 
were assumed. Institutional quality is nega-
tively affected by social inequality, both when 
the variable is considered exogenous (col-
umns 1 and 2), as well as when it is consid-
ered endogenous (columns 3 and 4). The 
possibility of obtaining resources outside the 
Table 3: Estimation of institutional quality 
 
Variables Governance 
Index  
(t-stat) 
Governance 
Index  
(t-stat) 
Governance 
Index  
(t-stat) 
Ethnic fragmentation (lfetn) -0.112 * 
(-1.786) 
  
Inequality (lGini index)  -0.770 *** 
(-2.978) 
-0.491 * 
(-1.762) 
Common Law (legor_uk) 0.468*** 
(4.003) 
0.476 *** 
(3.576) 
0.492 ** 
(3.067) 
Latitude (lat) 3.131 **** 
(8.634) 
3.126 *** 
(8.251) 
2.252 *** 
(4.562) 
Landlocked (nsea) -0.329 ** 
(-2.281) 
-0.340 ** 
(2.460) 
-0.385 ** 
(-2.371) 
Oil on export (lfuel) -0.007 *** 
(-3.278) 
-0.009 *** 
(-4.679) 
 
Taxes as part of GDP 
(tgdp) 
  0.022 *** 
(3.256) 
Europe and Central Asia 
(eco) 
-0.711 *** 
(-3.951) 
-0.862 *** 
(-5.331) 
-0.766 *** 
(-3.909) 
Southern Asia (sa) -1.221 *** 
(-4.508) 
-1.353 *** 
(-4.900) 
-0.926 
(-3.245) 
Adjusted R2  0.537 0.616 0.608 
Nº of countries 143 116 106 
Method: OLS 
Note: (***),(**) y (*): significant variable at 99, 95 and 90 percent, respectively. 
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tax system (estimated through the proportion 
of oil in exports) also negatively affects insti-
tutional quality. Trade openness, as has been 
suggested, seems to be positively related to 
institutional quality, while people’s educa-
tional level does not prove significant. Lastly, 
it should also be highlighted that other fac-
tors tackled by literature in this field, such as 
the legal tradition or the colonial origin, do 
not prove significant in this estimation once 
the other variables (particularly income 
level) have been incorporated  (a result that 
refuse the arguments of Mahoney, 2003, and 
Lange et al. 2006 about the legacy of the co-
lonialism). 
 
Table 4: Estimate of institutional quality 
 
Variables Governance Index 
(z stat) 
 
(1) 
Governance In-
dex 
(z stat) 
 
(2) 
Governance In-
dex 
(z stat) 
 
(3) 
Governance In-
dex 
(z stat) 
 
(4) 
Per capita income 
(ly06) 
0.769 *** 
(14.59) 
0.713 *** 
(11.76) 
0.591 *** 
(7.76) 
0.547 *** 
(7.25) 
Trade openness (ltr)  0.452 ** 
(2.28) 
 0.611 *** 
(3.00) 
Oil ON export (lfuel) -0.098 *** 
(-3.87) 
-0.084 *** 
(-2.90) 
-0.127 *** 
(-3.76) 
-0.079 ** 
(-2.50) 
Inequality (lgini) -0.387 * 
(-1.78) 
-0.445 ** 
(-2.09) 
-2.504 *** 
(-5.56) 
-1.550 *** 
(-3.78) 
Common Law (le-
gor_uk) 
0.136 
(1.08) 
0.082 
(0.63) 
  
Eastern Asia (ao)  -0.505 ** 
(-2.28) 
 -0.740 *** 
(-4.64) 
Europe and Central 
Asia (eco) 
-0.432 *** 
(-3.55) 
-0.669 *** 
(-4.17) 
-1.119 *** 
(-6.88) 
-0.996 *** 
(-5.55) 
Centered R2 
Uncentered R2 
0.682 
0.682 
0.681 
0.681 
0.633 
0.634 
0.639 
0.640 
Underid K-P test (p-
value) 
Weak identif K-P  
(crit- value) 
Overid. H-J test  
(p-value) 
χ2(3)=43.37(0,000) 
 
97.205(10%=22.30) 
 
χ2(2)=1.051(0,591) 
χ2(3)=16.51(0,000) 
 
12.956(15%= 9.93) 
 
χ2(2)=0.646(0,723) 
χ2(4)=29.94(0,000) 
 
12.65(15%= 11.22) 
 
χ2(3)=7.335 (0.06) 
χ2(4)=19.62(0,000) 
 
7.385(20%= 5.35) 
 
χ2(3)=5.624(0.131) 
Test on Instruments  
Overid Sargan test  
(p-value) 
Underid Anderson test 
(p-value) 
Weak Inst. Cragg-
Donald (critical value) 
 
χ2(2)=1.24 (0.535) 
 
χ2(3)=68.14(0.000) 
 
63.06(10% = 22.30) 
 
χ2(2)= 0.72 (0.697) 
 
χ2(3)= 39.9 (0.000) 
 
14.81 (15% = 9.93) 
 
χ2(3)= 4.84 (0.183) 
 
χ2(4)=30.84(0.000) 
 
8.15 (20% = 5.35) 
 
χ2(3)= 5.04 (0.168) 
 
χ2(4)=29.45(0.000) 
 
6.22 (20% = 5.35) 
Shea partial R2 (partial 
R2) 
ly06: 0.668 (0.668) 
 
ly06: 0.612 (0.670) 
ltr: 0.395 (0.432) 
ly06: 0.548 (0.749) 
lgini: 0.309 (0.422) 
 
ly06: 0.501 (0.751) 
lgini: 0.303 (0.426) 
ltr: 0.386 (0.422) 
Number of  
countries 
102 102 102 102 
 
Column (1) Instrumented variable: ly06; Included instrument: lfuel, lgini, lfuel legor_uk,  eco; excluded instrument: ly1900, lat, 
nsea 
Column (2) Instrumented variable: ly06, ltr; Included instrument: lfuel, lgini, legor_uk, ao, eco,; excluded instrument: ly1900, 
lat, nsea, lp 
Column (3) Instrumented variable: ly06, lgini; Included instrument: lfuel, eco; excluded instrument: ly1900, ly1900qua, lat, 
nsea, al 
Column (4) Instrumented variable: ly06, ltr, lgini; Included instrument: lfuel, ao, eco; excluded instrument: ly1900, ly1900qua, 
lat, nsea, lp, al 
Nota: (***),(**) y (*): variable significativa al 99, 95 y 90 por cien, respectivamente. 
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Table 5: Estimation of human capital 
 
Variables Average years of 
education 
 (1) 
 Average years of 
education 
(2) 
 Average years of 
education 
(3) 
Average years of 
education 
(4) 
Per capita income (ly06) 0.391 *** 
(3.97) 
0.385 *** 
(4.01) 
  
Governance index (ig) 0.013 
(0.12) 
 
 
0.490 *** 
(9.63) 
 
Rule of law (rule)  0.020 
(0.21)) 
 
 
0.449 *** 
(9.61) 
Europe and Central Asia 
(eco) 
0.349 
(5.65) 
0.354 *** 
(5.35) 
0.397 *** 
(5.23) 
0.481 *** 
(5.76) 
Centered R2 
Uncentered R2 
0.590 
0.947 
0.591 
0.947 
0.443 
0.930 
0.445 
0.930 
Underid K-P test  
(p-value) 
Weak identif K-P  
(crit- value) 
Overid. H-J test  
(p-value) 
χ2(4)=35.82(0,000) 
 
16.95(10%= 16.87) 
 
χ2(3)=0.430(0,806) 
χ2(4)=32.50(0,000) 
 
15.29(15%= 9.93) 
 
χ2(3)=0.344(0.841) 
χ2(2)=35.70(0,000) 
 
133.7(10%= 19.93) 
 
χ2(1)=0.161(0.686) 
χ2(2)=34.48(0,000) 
 
123.63(10%=19.93) 
 
χ2(1)=0.026(0.87) 
Test on Instruments  
Overid Sargan test  
(p-value) 
Underid Anderson 
Test (p-value) 
Weak Inst. Cragg-Donald 
(critical value) 
 
χ2(3)=0.196(0.906) 
 
χ2(4)=40.16(0.000) 
 
17.10(10%= 16.87) 
 
χ2(3)=0.174(0.916) 
 
χ2(4)=36.62(0.000) 
 
14.61 (15% = 9.93) 
 
χ2(1)=0.079(0.77)) 
 
χ2(2)=63.21(0.000) 
 
94.43(10% =19.93) 
 
χ2(1)= 0.01 (0.90) 
 
χ2(2)=61.25(0.000) 
 
85.85 (10%= 19.93) 
Shea partial R2 (partial 
R2) 
ly06: 0.479 (0.706) 
ig: 0.462 (0.680) 
ly06: 0.451 (0.706) 
rule:  0.418 (0.654) 
Ig: 0.679 (0.679) ly06: 0.658 (0.658) 
 
Number of  
countries 
88 88 93 93 
 
Column (1) Instrumented variable: ly06, ig; Included instrument: eco,; excluded instrument: ly1900,ly1900qua, lfetn, as 
 
Column (2) Instrumented variable: ly06, rule; Included instrument: eco,; excluded instrument: ly1900,ly1900qua, lfetn, as 
 
Column (3) Instrumented variable: ig; Included instrument:  eco; excluded instrument: ly1900, lfetn 
 
Column (4) Instrumented variable: rule; Included instrument:  eco; excluded instrument: ly1900, lfetn 
 
Note: (***),(**) y (*): significant variable at 99, 95 and 90 percent, respectively. 
Lastly, the fourth variable considered in 
equation (1) is the one which refers to hu-
man capital, estimated by the average num-
ber of years of study of a country’s people 
(Barro and Lee, 2000). Initially, it is sup-
posed that the level of human capital might 
be conditioned by the per capita level of the 
society: the higher the income, the higher the 
resources there will be to finance the educa-
tional system and the higher the demand for 
trained workers. It is also possible that insti-
tutional quality influences the educational 
level of the population since a suitable provi-
sion of public goods - like education - forms 
part of the quality of the institutions.  In both 
cases, it can be supposed that it is a two-way 
relationship in the sense that both economic 
progress as well as institutional quality influ-
ence educational level and that education 
influences the productive and institutional 
capability of the society (as Glaeser et al. 
2004 assume). This is why it is necessary to  
carry out the estimation in the same way as 
we did in previous steps. 
 
The estimation confirms that per capita in-
come is a solid explanatory variable for level 
of training (columns 1 and 2 of table 5). This 
result is enough to confirm the endogeneity 
of the variable in (1). Nevertheless, institu-
tional quality is not significant. That result 
could be due to the high level of correlation 
between income level and institutional qual-
ity. In fact, if the income variable is removed, 
institutional quality (measured through Gov-
ernance Index and its component on Rule of 
Law) appears as a conditioning factor for 
educational level, although with a low ex-
planatory capacity (columns 3 and 4 of table 
5). The incorporation of trade openness into 
these equations does not produce significant 
results, which means that, initially, at least, it 
is not plausible to say that open trade affects 
people’s level of training. 
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Table 6: Factors determining development 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Aggregate indicator 
of governance (ig) 
0.857 *** 
(9.57) 
0.852 *** 
(10.09) 
0.852 *** 
(9.15) 
0.766*** 
(10.85) 
0.727 *** 
(5.92) 
Openness of trade 
(ltr) 
-0.019 
(-0.09) 
0.207 
(1.04) 
0,221 
(1,18) 
0.066 
(0.40) 
0.075 
(0.41) 
Years of educatio 
(lmae) 
    0.535 * 
(1.96) 
Absence of direct 
sea access (nsea) 
-0.413 *** 
(-3.21) 
-0,245 ** 
(-2.16) 
-0,232 ** 
(-2,06) 
-0.300*** 
(2.69) 
-0.350*** 
(-2.74) 
Latitude (lat) 1.704 *** 
(3.39) 
0.088 
(0.19) 
0.108 
(0.23) 
  
Common Law   0,002 
(0,02) 
-0.073 
(-0.60) 
-0.709 
(-0.56) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.944 *** 
(-6.79) 
-0,962 *** 
(-6.57) 
-0,819 *** 
(-4.42) 
-0.683 *** 
(-3.35) 
Centered R2 
Uncentered R2 
 0,666 
0,993 
 0,755 
 0,995 
0,758 
0,995 
0.877 
0.997 
0.871 
0.997 
Underid K-P test (p-
value) 
 
Weak identify. test 
K-P (critical value) 
 
Overid. H-J test  
(p-value) 
χ2(2)=25.44(0,000) 
 
 
23.45(10%= 13.43)  
 
 
χ2(1)=2.57  (0,108) 
χ2(3)=28.65(0,000) 
 
 
18.12(10%= 16.87) 
 
 
χ2(2)=1.34  (0,511) 
χ2(3)=29.80(0,000) 
 
 
19.68(10%= 16.87) 
 
 
χ2(2)=1.33 (0,514) 
χ2(4)=20.48(0,000) 
 
 
12.48(15%=11.22) 
 
 
χ2(3)=4.21(0,238) 
χ2(4)=13.13(0,010) 
 
 
9.40 (10%= 7.77)  
 
 
χ2(3)=4.30(0,230) 
Test on  
Instruments  
Overid Sargan test 
(p-value) 
Underid Anderson 
test (p-value) 
Weak Inst. Cragg-
Donald (critical 
value) 
 
 
χ2(1)= 2.62 (0.105) 
 
χ2(2)=48.54(0.000) 
 
23.63(10% =13.43) 
 
 
χ2(2)= 0.67 (0.714) 
 
χ2(3)=48.59(0.000) 
 
17.48(10% =16.87) 
 
 
χ2(2)= 0.69 (0.705) 
 
χ2(3)=46.87(0.000) 
 
16.48(10% =16.87) 
 
 
χ2(3)= 3.81 (0.281) 
 
χ2(4)=36.93(0.000) 
 
11.52(15% =11.22) 
 
 
χ2(3)= 3.70 (0.294) 
 
χ2(4)=21.94(0.000) 
 
4.46 (30% = 4.40) 
Shea partial R2 
(partial R2) 
ig: 0.410 (0.417) 
ltr: 0.352 (0.358) 
ig: 0.413 (0.419) 
ltr: 0.352 (0.357) 
ig: 0.416 (0.429) 
ltr: 0.352 (0.363) 
ig: 0.589 (0.623) 
ltr: 0.445 (0.471) 
ig: 0.375 (0.773) 
ltr: 0.464 (0.495) 
Lmae:0.303(0.619) 
Number of countries 141 141 141 85 76 
Column (1): Instrumented variable: ig y ltr; Included instrument: nsea, lat; excluded instrument: ly1900, ly1900qua, lp, lcry 
Column (2): Instrumented variable: ig y ltr; Included instrument: nsea, lat, as; excluded instrument: ly1900, ly1900qua, lp, lcry 
Column (3): Instrumented variable: ig y ltr; Included instrument: nsea, lat, legor_uk, as; excluded instrument: ly1900, ly1900qua, 
lp, lcry 
Column (4): Instrumented variable: ig y ltr; Included instrument: lmae, nsea, legor_uk, as; excluded instrument: ly1900,  lp,  
lfetn, eco 
Column (5): Instrumented variable: ig, ltr, lmae; Included instrument:  nsea, legor_uk, as; excluded instrument: ly1900,  lp,  lfetn, 
lat, lmae60,  eco 
Note: (***),(**) y (*): significant variable atl 99, 95 and 90 percent, respectively. 
 
5.2. FACTORS DETERMINING DEVELOP-
MENT 
 
After the analysis carried out, it is possible to 
test the weight which the four main factors 
(geography, institutions, trade and educa-
tion) have on the processes of development. 
Three of those factors are endogenous (insti-
tutions, trade and human capital); geography 
can, by contrast, be considered exogenous. 
The previous steps have allowed us to iden-
tify the suitable instruments for the endoge-
nous variables. 
 
The estimation suggests that the level of de-
velopment is explained strongest by the insti-
tutional variable: it appears as significant and 
with the expected sign in all the estimates 
(table 6). This reinforces the interpretation of 
Rodrik et al. (2002) and those suggested by 
AJR y ES. As in the study by Rodrik et al. 
(2002), the variable referring to trade inte-
gration does not prove significant in any of 
the tests, although they all present an ade-
quate sign (which does not happen in Rodrik 
et al., 2002). Nevertheless, trade openness 
has an indirect influence on the level of de-
velopment through its effect on institutional 
quality. Of all the variables mentioned to do 
with geography, it is the absence of direct sea 
access which proves significant, which has a 
negative sign, as might have been expected. 
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The significance of the distance to the tropics 
is cancelled out once a dummy reference to 
Sub-Saharan Africa is incorporated. 
 
Ethnic fragmentation, which influences insti-
tutional quality negatively, and the size of the 
regional markets in 1900, which operates 
through open trade, both work with the ade-
quate sign in the estimation of the variable. 
In terms of regional particularities, both 
southern Asia as well as Sub-Saharan Africa 
present development results which are lower 
than the model assign them. 
 
5.3. ANALYSIS OF ROBUSTNESS 
 
Given the weakness of the measurement of 
institutional quality, it seems reasonable to 
try to repeat the model using alternative indi-
cators. In particular, firstly, the estimate was 
repeated using each one of the six central 
components of the World Bank’s Governance 
index as expressive variables for institutional 
quality (Table A.1., in the Annex). In order 
to help the comparison the structure of the 
selected instruments in table 6 was main-
tained. The results confirm the central role 
which the institutions have in the explana-
tion of development. In the same way, educa-
tion is significant in all estimations. The same 
does not happen, however, with trade open-
ness which, although it has an adequate sign, 
does not prove significant in any of the cases. 
With a single exception (the estimate using 
the Regulation component), the absence of 
direct sea access proves a significant obstacle 
to promoting development; and that is con-
firmed in equally general terms in the anoma-
lous performance of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Secondly, to confirm the results, the model 
was repeated substituting the Governance 
Index (and its components) for other alterna-
tive indicators of institutional quality. More 
precisely, the Institutions component of the 
Global Competitiveness Indicator (CGI) was 
used, as were the Objective Governance Indi-
cators (OGI), the Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) and Doing Business (through the 
ranking it creates). The results confirm those 
of the previous pages. Institutional quality is 
the only variable that is significant in the 
explanation of development, whichever indi-
cator is adopted. Trade openness does not 
prove significant in any of the options; and 
the educational level is significant in two 
(CPI and GCI). 
 
Lastly, an alternative means of checking the 
robustness of the results is to repeat the exer-
cise with the strongest quality indicator (IG) 
but on sub-samples of the countries. The 
equation was estimated for two alternative 
groups: i) the one made up of the poorest 
countries, those which make up the groups 
of middle-low and low income, in terms of 
the World Bank’s classification; and ii) the 
one made up of those countries which were 
colonies of European countries. The results 
generally confirm those previously obtained: 
institutions seem to be a highly significant 
variable in both cases, trade openness only in 
the case of the colonies and educational level 
in those middle-low and low-income coun-
tries (Table 7). Sub-Saharan Africa tends to 
present a lower income level to that which 
would correspond to its relationship in the 
model.  
 
6. Final considerations 
 
As the results of the estimate show, geogra-
phy and institutions powerfully influence the 
developmental possibilities of countries. Of 
the geographical conditioners, the most rele-
vant one is that related to the absence of di-
rect sea access. Latitude and other geographi-
cal conditioners disappear as direct variables 
in the explanation when other variables are 
incorporated. Whichever indicator is 
adopted, the quality of the institutions seems 
to condition countries’ levels of development. 
Nevertheless, institutional quality does not 
seem to be conditioned by those historical 
factors to which other studies allude (models 
of colonisation or traditions of the legal sys-
tem, for instance), but rather by the level of 
development, the degree of social fragmenta-
tion and inequality and, in some cases, by the 
non-fiscal nature of the main resources of the 
State. The educational level of the population 
seems to influence developmental possibili-
ties but that relationship is weaker, depend-
ing on the indicators which are used to 
measure institutional quality and the group 
of countries chosen for the estimation. At the 
same time, the possible presence of a net-
work of urban nuclei in the close region 
seems to have affected possibilities for coun-
tries’ international integration. That said, the 
model is incapable of illustrating in a robust 
way the effect of this variable (trade open-
ness) on the level of development. Lastly, the 
model shows that Sub-Saharan Africa is an 
exception since its degree of development is 
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lower than the level which the rest of the 
variables assign it. 
 
The results of the empirical exercise ade-
quately confirm the hypotheses with which 
we started out. However, it is worth temper-
ing optimism by recalling the warning which 
Bardhan (2005; 6) once made about this type 
of econometric procedure: “finding an in-
strument that identifies an exogenous source 
of variation in the income determinants is 
quite different from unearthing an adequate 
and satisfactory causal explanation”. 
 
Beyond the overall picture which the results 
present, crucial questions remain about how  
each country took advantage of the factors 
which were considered here. For example, 
what did Australia do to overcome its limited 
access to regional markets and, by contrast, 
why did Morocco not take advantage of its 
relative advantage in this respect; or why did 
Canada overcome its high linguistic fragmen-
tation and Madagascar not benefit from 
greater homogeneity? These are questions 
which call into doubt meta-historical con-
structions which propose the identification of 
a single and universal reason for economic 
backwardness and, by contrast, they under-
line the need to study the particularities of 
each case: a task which should go hand-in-
hand with a deeper and more imaginative 
historical study.  
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Table 7: Factors determining development in two groups of developing countries 
Sample Medium-low and low 
income  
countries 
 
(1) 
Former  
colonies 
 
 
(2) 
Institutional quality (ig) 0.844 *** 
(4.14) 
0.839 *** 
(3.69) 
Openness (ltr) 0.098 
(0.31) 
0.491 ** 
(2.14) 
Educational level (lmae) 0.396 * 
(1.85) 
0.257 
(0.97) 
Absence of direct sea 
access (nsea) 
-0.234 
(-1.45) 
-0.442 ** 
(-2.24) 
Sub-Saharan Africa - 0.700 *** 
(-4.48) 
- 0.920 *** 
(-4.53) 
Centered R2 
 
Uncentered R2 
0.800 
 
0.997 
0.813 
 
0.996 
Underid K-P test  
(p-value) 
 
Weak identif K-P  
(crit- value) 
 
Overid. H-J test (p-
value) 
χ2(3)=11.96(0,007) 
 
 
3.72 (30%=4.30)  
 
 
χ2(2)=0.88 (0,643) 
χ2(3)=10.10(0,017) 
 
 
4.242 (30%= 4.30)  
 
 
χ2(2)=0.869 (0,641) 
Test on Instruments  
 
Overid Sargan test  
(p-value) 
 
Underid Anderson test 
(p-value) 
 
Weak Inst. Cragg-
Donald (critical value) 
 
 
χ2(2)= 0.783 (0.676) 
 
 
χ2(3)= 10.46 (0.015) 
 
 
2.294  (30% = 4.30) 
 
 
χ2(2)= 0.708 (0.701) 
 
 
χ2(3)= 14.33 (0.002) 
 
 
3.405 (30% = 4.30) 
Shea partial R2 (partial 
R2) ig: 0.427 (0.527) 
ltr: 0.313 (0.373) 
lmae: 0.469 (0.610 
ig: 0.332 (0.620) 
ltr: 0.505 (0.507) 
lmae: 0.366 (0.689) 
Number of countries 36 48 
 
Column (1): Instrumented variable: ig, ltr, lame; Included instrument: nsea, as; excluded instrument: ly1900,  lp, lfetn, lat, 
lmae60 
Column (2): Instrumented variable: ig, ltr, lame; Included instrument: nsea, as; excluded instrument: ly1900,  lp, lfetn, lat, 
lmae60 
Note: (***),(**) y (*): significant variable atl 99, 95 and 90 percent, respectively. 
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ANNEX I: ANALYSIS OF ROBUSTNESS 
 
TABLE A.1: FACTORS DETERMINING DEVELOPMENT WITH INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY MEASURED BY THE  
COMPONENTS OF THE GOVERNANCE INDEX 
 
Componet of Gov-
ernance Index 
(1) 
(Voice) 
(2) 
(Stability) 
(3) 
(Effectiveness) 
(4) 
(Regulation) 
(5) 
(Rule) 
(6) 
(Corruption) 
Governance Index 
 
0.698 *** 
(4.78) 
0.481 *** 
(3.09) 
0.599 
(5.20) 
0.726 *** 
(5.09) 
0.600 *** 
(5,29) 
0.516 *** 
(4.60) 
Openness of trade 
(ltr) 
0.366 ** 
(2.05) 
0.029 
(0.16) 
0,131 
(0.80) 
0,046 
(0.26) 
0.095 
(0.45) 
0.038 
(0.70) 
Educational level 
(lmae) 
0.601 
(2.00) 
1.084  
(3.16) 
0.664 
(2.49) 
0.640 
(2.07) 
0.707 
(2.68) 
0.816 
(2.93) 
Absence of direct 
sea access (nsea) 
-0.431 *** 
(-2.89) 
-0,420 ** 
(-2.38) 
-0,349  
(-2.55) 
-0,214 ** 
(-1.37) 
-0.375 ** 
(2,73) 
-0.450*** 
(-2.97) 
Sub-Saharan  
Africa  
-0.709 *** 
(-3.47) 
-0.756 *** 
(-3.10) 
-0,596 *** 
(-3.45) 
-0.588 *** 
(-2.83) 
-0.569 *** 
(-3.00) 
-0.573 *** 
(-3.20) 
Centered R2 
Uncentered R2 
 0,816 
0,996 
 0,796 
 0,995 
0,873 
0,997 
0,832 
0,996 
0.852 
0.996 
0.843 
0.996 
Underid K-P test  
(p-value) 
 
Weak identify. test 
K-P (critical value) 
 
Overid. H-J test  
(p-value) 
 
χ2(5)=9.84 (0,070) 
 
 
3.30 (30%= 4.44)  
 
 
χ2(4)=6.23 (0,182) 
χ2(4)=14.16(0,000) 
 
 
4.98 (30%= 4.40)  
 
 
χ2(3)=7.17  (0,066) 
χ2(4)=13.253(0,010) 
 
 
19.05 (5%= 12.20)  
 
 
χ2(3)=0.989 (0,802) 
χ2(4)=11.94 (0,01) 
 
 
8.47 (10%= 7.77)  
 
 
χ2(3)=1.57 (0,666) 
χ2(4)=16.90(0,002) 
 
 
16.69 (5%= 12.20)  
 
 
χ2(3)=3.07 (0,380) 
χ2(4)=15.27(0,004) 
 
 
25.80 (5%= 12.20)  
 
 
χ2(3)=0.783(0,853) 
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Test on  
Instruments  
Overid Sargan test 
(p-value) 
Underid Anderson 
test (p-value) 
Weak Inst. Cragg-
Donald (critical value) 
 
 
χ2(4)= 2.62(0.105) 
 
χ2(5)=48.54(0.000) 
 
 
23.63(10%=13.43) 
 
 
χ2(3)= 7.97(0.04) 
 
χ2(4)=17.96(0.001) 
 
 
17.48(10%=16.87) 
 
 
χ2(3)= 0.36 (0.947) 
 
χ2(4)=20.012(0.000) 
 
 
3.98 (30% = 4.40) 
 
 
χ2(3)= 0.92 (0.819) 
 
χ2(4)=17.56(0.000) 
 
 
3.35 (30% = 4.4) 
 
 
χ2(3)= 2.03 (0.566) 
 
χ2(4)=27.05(0.000) 
 
 
6.08 (20% = 5.35) 
 
 
χ2(3)=0.197(0.978) 
 
χ2(4)=25.13(0.000) 
 
 
5.49 (30% = 4.40) 
Shea partial R2  
(partial R2) 
voice: 0.200 (0.664) 
 
ltr: 0.458 (0.513) 
 
lmae: 0.180 (0.646) 
stab: 0.272 (0.614) 
 
ltr: 0.442 (0.513) 
 
lmae: 0.295(0.644) 
efect:0.355(0.779) 
 
ltr: 0.476 (0.513) 
 
lmae: 0.283 (0.644) 
ig: 0.281 (0.684) 
 
ltr: 0.469 (0.513) 
 
lmae: 0.261(0.644) 
rule: 0.442 (0.739) 
 
ltr: 0.468 (0.495) 
 
lmae: 0.371(0.619) 
corrup: 0.424(0.807) 
 
ltr: 0.455 (0.513) 
 
Lmae: 0.342 (0.644) 
Number of  
countries 
 
77 
 
77 
 
77 
 
77 
 
77 
 
76 
Column (1): Instrumented variable: voice, ltr, lmae; Included instrument: nsea, ast; excluded instrument: ly1900, ly1900qua, lp, lfetn lmae60 al eco 
Column (2): Instrumented variable: stability, ltr, lmae; Included instrument: nsea, ast; excluded instrument: ly1900, lp, lfetn lmae60 al eco 
Column (3): Instrumented variable: efectiv, ltr, lmae; Included instrument: nsea, ast; excluded instrument: ly1900, lp, lfetn lmae60 al eco 
Column (4): Instrumented variable: regul, ltr, lmae; Included instrument: nsea, ast; excluded instrument: ly1900, lp, lfetn lmae60 al eco 
Column (5): Instrumented variable: rule, ltr, lmae; Included instrument: nsea, ast; excluded instrument: ly1900, lp, lfetn lmae60 al eco 
Column (6): Instrumented variable: corrupt, ltr, lmae; Included instrument: nsea, ast; excluded instrument: ly1900, lp, lfetn lmae60 al eco 
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TABLE A.2.: FACTORS DETERMINING DEVELOPMENT WITH  INSTITUTIONAL  
QUALITY MEASURED BY ALTERNATIVE INDICATORS 
 
 (1) 
(OGI) 
(2) 
CPI 
(3) 
GCI (Institut) 
(4) 
DB 
Governance  
indicator (ig) 
1.939 *** 
(5.23) 
0.239 *** 
(4.98) 
0.570 *** 
(3.52) 
-0.022 *** 
(-4.62) 
Openness of trade 
(ltr) 
0.007 
(0.03) 
0.090 
(0.39) 
0.148 
(0.57) 
-0,050 
(-0.21) 
Educational level 
(lmae) 
-0.055 
(-0.12) 
0.842 *** 
(2.93) 
1.005 ** 
(2.53) 
-0.137 
(-0.33) 
Absence of direct 
sea access (nsea) 
0.148  
(0.46) 
-0,468 ** 
(-2.79) 
-0.448 ** 
(-2.12) 
-0,165 
(-0.93) 
Sub-Saharan  
Africa 
-0.344  
(-1.14) 
-0.549 ** 
(-2.66) 
-0.398 
(-1.59) 
-0.719 *** 
(-3.16) 
Centered R2 
Uncentered R2 
 0,679 
0,993 
 0,813 
 0,966 
0,705 
0,995 
0,739 
0,994 
Underid K-P test (p-
value) 
Weak identify. test 
K-P (critical value) 
Overid. H-J test  
(p-value) 
χ2(4)=7.808(0,09) 
 
7.09 (20%= 5.35)  
 
 
χ2(3)=0.54 (0,90) 
χ2(4)=14.55(0,005) 
 
27.25 (5%= 12.20)  
 
 
χ2(3)=2.30  (0,51) 
χ2(4)=14.97(0,004) 
 
72.33 (5%= 12.20)  
 
 
χ2(3)=1.82 (0361) 
χ2(4)=10.34(0,035) 
 
11.94 (10%= 7.77)  
 
 
χ2(3)=0.80 (0,849) 
Test on  
Instruments  
Overid Sargan test 
(p-value) 
Underid Anderson 
test (p-value) 
Weak Inst.  
Cragg-Donald  
(critical value) 
 
 
χ2(3)=0.49 (0.920) 
 
χ2(4)=9.34 (0.052) 
 
 
1.57 (30% = 4.40) 
 
 
χ2(3)=2.17 (0.53) 
 
χ2(4)=32.89 
(0.000) 
 
8.59 (10% = 7.77) 
 
 
χ2(3)= 1.25 (0.739) 
 
χ2(4)=27.64(0.000) 
 
 
6.97 (20% = 5.35) 
 
 
χ2(3)= 0.37 (0.94) 
 
χ2(4)=14.45(0.006) 
 
 
2.26 (30% = 4.40) 
Shea partial R2 
(partial R2) 
ogi: 0.137 (0.513) 
 
ltr: 0.456 (0.517) 
 
lmae: 0.183(0.640) 
cpi: 0.551 (0.803) 
 
ltr: 0.474 (0.517) 
 
lmae: 0.447(0.640) 
gci: 0.507 (0.659) 
 
ltr: 0.554 (0.556) 
 
lmae: 0.473(0.626) 
ig: 0.207 (0.619) 
 
ltr: 0.414 (0.474) 
 
lmae: 0.224 (0.649)  
Number of countries 75 75 64 75 
Column (1): Instrumented variable: ogi, ltr, lmae; Included instrument: nsea, ast; excluded instrument: ly1900, ly1900qua, 
lp, lfetn lmae60 al eco 
Column (2): Instrumented variable: cpi, ltr, lmae; Included instrument: nsea, ast; excluded instrument: ly1900, lp, lfetn 
lmae60 al eco 
Column (3): Instrumented variable: compet_index, ltr, lmae; Included instrument: nsea, ast; excluded instrument: ly1900, 
lp, lfetn lmae60 al eco 
Column (4): Instrumented variable: db, ltr, lmae; Included instrument: nsea, ast; excluded instrument: ly1900, lp, lfetn 
lmae60 al eco  
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ANNEX II: DATA SOURCES AND DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
 
Institutional Quality: 2006 World Bank Governance Indicators average  
 
Per capita Income: per capita GDP (PPP) 2006 and 1900. Source: Maddison 
 
Gini Index:  Latest year available. Source: World Bank. 
 
Education: Average years of school for the population aged over 25 years. Source: Barro and Lee 
(2000) 
 
Taxes: The main source of homogeneous information on tax revenue is provided by the IMF 
through Government Finance Statistics, which, in turn, is used by the World Bank in World De-
velopment Indicators. However, both sources face two serious problems. On the one hand, the 
series are incomplete for many developing countries. On the other, data usually refer to central 
governments, which is inaccurate information in highly decentralized countries. Therefore, to 
overcome these problems several sources have been used. For Latin America, Gomez Sabaini 
(2005) has been employed, except for Venezuela, whose data corresponds to the World Bank. For 
the OECD countries, we used the data provided by this organization. For the rest of countries, two 
sources have been used. Firstly, the World Bank in countries for which data is available and reli-
able. The WB provides data from income tax excluding social security. Also, it provides separately 
data for the latter. Therefore, it has been proceeded to add them up. The University of Michigan 
World Tax Database is the second source used in countries for which the WB has no data 
(http://www.bus.umich.edu/OTPR/otpr/) or is not reliable. Data year is 2000. Yet, in some cases, 
data was not available for that year, and we selected the closest year available, with a maximum 
difference of three years (see Garcimartin et al., 2006). 
 
Openness rate: exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP (2000-4 average). Source: World Bank  
Ethnic Fragmentation. Source: Alesina et al. (2003) 
 
Population: 2004. Source: World Bank 
 
Oil on export: Percentage of fuel exports on total exports. 2004. Source: World Bank  
 
Geographic location: Latitude in absolute value of each country’s capital, divided by 90. Source: 
Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2007 
 
Common Law: Origin of the legal system. Source: La Porta (1999) website of Quality of Govern-
ment.  
 
Colonial Origin: own elaboration based on Bertocchi and Canova (2002)  
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